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On March 17, 2003, the trustees of the Social
Security program released their annual report
on the system’s financial status. Many observers
took the report’s extension of the trust fund’s
solvency one year to 2042 to mean that Social
Security’s financial health had improved. In fact,
Social Security’s actuarial balance declined and
its cash flow deficits over the next 75 years
increased to $25.33 trillion (in 2003 dollars).
More important, the report contained signif-
icant new methodologies that are central to the
debate over personal retirement accounts. 
The trustees now measure Social Security’s
deficits over the infinite horizon, providing
remedies to the previous 75-year scoring win-
dow that substantially understates the costs of
the current program and overstates the costs of
personal account plans. Under this new perpe-
tuity benchmark, the present value of Social
Security’s cash flow shortfalls totals $11.9 tril-
lion, versus only $4.9 trillion over 75 years. To
cover Social Security’s cash deficits permanently
would demand an immediate tax increase equal
to 4.47 percent of payroll. 
The 2003 report also includes a “stochastic
analysis” accounting for the variability of the
economic and demographic factors affecting
Social Security’s finances, finding there is less
than a 1-in-40 chance of Social Security remain-
ing solvent for even 75 years without reform. 
The 2003 Trustees Report shows that Social
Security’s cash deficits are large, growing, and
unlikely to fix themselves without action. Only
personal account proposals have been certified
to eliminate Social Security’s multitrillion dollar
cash shortfalls.
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Introduction
Media attention regarding the 2003
Trustees Report,1 released March 17, focused
almost exclusively on the delay of the trust
fund’s insolvency date from 2041 to 2042,
with news service headlines such as “Social
Security Fully Funded until 2042” from
Scripps Howard and the Associated Press’s
“Social Security Stronger Than a Year Ago”
indicating the general tenor of press coverage.2
Prominent critics of Social Security reform,
such as Rep. Robert Matsui (D-Calif.), argued
that the one-year extension of trust fund sol-
vency “made it clear that Social Security is not
facing the crisis that its opponents claim. . . .
Those who claim that Social Security is bank-
rupt are misleading the public.”3
The focus on the trust fund’s exhaustion
date is understandable, particularly given the
media’s difficult task of making a complex
issue understandable to the public. 
Nevertheless, the trust fund’s insolvency
date is just one—and hardly the most impor-
tant—indicator of Social Security’s fiscal viabili-
ty. Although largely ignored by the press, the
2003 Trustees Report contained important
new information regarding Social Security’s
financial strength and new methods of analysis
that strengthen the case for reform based on
personal retirement accounts. Among that
information is the following:
• Social Security’s actuarial balance (the
official measure of its financial health)
worsened to a deficit of 1.92 percent of
payroll over 75 years. Social Security’s
cash deficits over the next 75 years
increased to $25.33 trillion (in constant
2003 dollars). The single year of addi-
tional trust fund solvency, which was
due to one-time corrections of several
economic and demographic assump-
tions, hides an overall decline in Social
Security’s financial strength.
• The trustees now extend their measure-
ment of Social Security’s deficits from
75 years to the infinite horizon, portray-
ing more accurately the seriousness of
Social Security’s financing problems. To
cover Social Security’s total cash short-
falls in perpetuity would demand a
lump sum payment today of $11.9 tril-
lion. Delay only increases this cost.
• To achieve permanent solvency under
traditional Social Security financing
would demand an immediate tax
increase equal to 4.47 percent of payroll:
0.67 percent to redeem the trust fund’s
bonds from 2018 through 2042, 1.92
percent to maintain solvency from 2042
through 2075, and 1.88 percent to
achieve permanent solvency thereafter.
By contrast, a number of personal
account plans are certified by Social
Security’s actuaries to achieve sustain-
able solvency without large tax increases.
• Measuring solvency over the infinite
term removes a significant methodolog-
ical bias against personal accounts. For
instance, scoring one personal accounts
proposal from the pesident’s reform
commission in perpetuity rather than
just 75 years improves its impact on the
federal budget by the equivalent of a
lump sum payment today of roughly
$860 billion.
• The 2003 report includes a “stochastic
analysis” that accounts for the infinite
variability of the economic and demo-
graphic factors affecting Social Security’s
finances. This stochastic analysis finds
there is less than a 1-in-40 chance of Social
Security remaining solvent for even 75
years without reform, rebutting critics
who claim that slightly higher economic
growth will keep Social Security’s finances
on track. 
The trustees conclude that Social Security
“continues to fail our test of financial balance by a
wide margin.”4 The new methods introduced
in the 2003 report, by contrast, succeed in
clarifying the program’s financial position,
showing Social Security’s true cash shortfalls
to be 2.5 times larger than previously under-
stood, growing with each passing year, and
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highly unlikely to be averted without reform. 
Only proposals based on personal retire-
ment accounts have been certified by Social
Security’s independent actuaries to eliminate
the program’s substantial cash deficits, not
just for 75 years but forever. Personal account
plans also address many of Social Security’s
nonfinancial shortcomings, not detailed
here, which can include discriminatory treat-
ment of single workers and dual-earner cou-
ples, divorced individuals, younger workers,
and African Americans and other individuals
with shorter life expectancies.5
System Solvency
Each year, Social Security’s trustees exam-
ine projections for the various economic and
demographic variables that affect the pro-
gram’s financial health. In the 2003 Trustees
Report the trustees project that Social Security
will begin running cash deficits in 2018, a
delay of one year from the 2002 report.
Likewise, the 2003 report also projects a one-
year delay in the insolvency of the Social
Security trust fund, from 2041 to 2042. The
date of trust fund exhaustion, when by law
benefits must be reduced to the level payable
with tax revenues alone, is given the greatest
prominence in media coverage of the trustees
annual findings.
A number of small changes were made in
these economic and demographic assumptions
regarding Social Security’s financing, which is
common from year to year. For instance, the
results of the 2000 census showed the popula-
tion to be higher than was assumed in prior
reports, which had to extrapolate population
estimates without the benefit of the most
recent census data. A larger population increas-
es the assumed number of workers paying into
the program, which can strengthen the system’s
finances. However, it also reduces the projected
fertility rate: since the number of births is better
known than the total population of parents
associated with those births, and increased
overall population implies a lower fertility rate.
Reduced fertility rates entail slower labor force
growth, which is central to the decline of Social
Security’s “pay-as-you-go” financing.
Also, new data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics show that wage growth during
2001 and 2002 was slightly lower than had
been assumed in the 2002 Trustees Report.
Although lower wage growth reduces actuar-
ial balance in the long term, it is reported
that, since benefits are tied to wages, the cor-
rected wage growth figures entail slightly
lower benefit obligations in the medium
term and therefore contributed to the exten-
sion of trust fund solvency.6 Nevertheless, the
long-term effect of corrected wage growth
figures for 2001–2002 should be modest.
However, the one-year increase in trust
fund solvency from 2041 to 2042 is largely
attributable to the 2000 census’s findings of
a substantially higher level of “other than
legal” immigration than was previously
assumed. Specifically, the new findings led to
projections of 400,000 illegal immigrants
annually—a one-third increase over the 2002
projection.7 Since many illegal immigrants
pay payroll taxes and proportionately fewer
collect benefits, an increase in their number
can have beneficial effects on Social
Security’s finances. The trustees report that it
was the assumed increase in illegal immigra-
tion that pushed the date of first cash flow
deficits from 2017 to 2018, contributing to
the additional year of trust fund solvency.8
Although an extra year’s trust fund sol-
vency is certainly desirable, the economic and
demographic adjustments (noted above) are
one-time recalculations that are unlikely to
be repeated in the future. They do not reflect
larger trends or changes in the growth rates
of those factors that could have substantial
ongoing effects, and there is no reason to
believe that in following years we will see fur-
ther delays in Social Security’s projected
dates of cash flow deficits or trust fund insol-
vency.
More important, as Social Security’s two
public trustees—Profs. Thomas R. Saving of
Texas A&M University and John L. Palmer of
Syracuse—stress in their statement attached
to the report,
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Public concern about the financial future of
Medicare and Social Security tends to focus
unduly on their trust fund exhaustion dates,
when benefits scheduled under cur-
rent law legally could no longer be paid
in full, rather than on the more imme-
diate and fundamental financial chal-
lenges posed by the two programs.9
It is in 2018, when Social Security begins to
collect less in taxes than is needed to pay
annual benefits, that the government must
produce extra cash to finance the program.
Saving and Palmer continue, 
While projected assets of the
[Hospital Insurance] and [Old Age,
Survivors and Disability Insurance]
Trust Funds are sufficient to pay
projected Medicare and Social
Security benefits under current law
for another 23 and 39 years, respec-
tively, such a perspective belies the enor-
mous—and more immediate—fiscal chal-
lenge these programs pose. From a uni-
fied budget perspective, substantial
fiscal pressure from Medicare and
Social Security will appear in a
decade and mount rapidly there-
after. At the time of OASDI Trust
Fund estimated exhaustion in 2042,
annual Social Security expenditures
are projected to exceed annual tax
income by 34 percent, with this
excess growing to 49 percent by the
end of the 75-year projection period.
By the time the combined OASDI
Trust Fund is exhausted in 2042, the
redemption of its Treasury bonds to
pay scheduled benefits will be requir-
ing an annual general revenue trans-
fer of $375 billion (in today’s dol-
lars), or the equivalent of nearly 19
percent of Federal income tax rev-
enues under the same assumption.10
It is even earlier—in 2008—when Social
Security’s payroll tax surpluses begin to
decline and the program’s subsidy to the rest
of the budget is reduced. “Despite little
change in the near term financial outlook for
OASDI,” Saving and Palmer write, “in the
longer term the outlook has deteriorated
somewhat.”11
This deterioration of Social Security’s
financial health is clear in several ways. First, in
terms of its actuarial balance, which is the offi-
cial measure of the financial strength of the
Social Security program. In the 2002 Trustees
Report, Social Security had an actuarial deficit
of 1.87 percent of payroll. In the 2003 report,
Social Security’s actuarial deficit increased to
1.92 percent of payroll. That is to say, despite
press headlines to the contrary, officially speak-
ing Social Security’s financing health worsened
over the past year. As the trustees stated in the
2003 report, although Social Security’s
finances are healthy in the short run, “it is out
of long-range close actuarial balance.”12
Simply put, actuarial balance represents
the present value of Social Security’s annual
surpluses or deficits over 75 years as a per-
centage of payroll, represented in Figure 1,
plus the value of trust fund balances during
the period. An actuarial deficit of 1.92 per-
cent of payroll means that, technically speak-
ing, a payroll tax increase of 1.92 percentage
points today would keep Social Security sol-
vent through 75 years. 
Stress should be placed on the word “tech-
nically,” however: a payroll tax increase would
produce cash surpluses in the short term, but
only if those short-term surpluses are effec-
tively saved for the future will the program
have reached solvency in a meaningful eco-
nomic or budgetary sense, in which burdens
on future workers are reduced by additional
contributions from today’s workers. Many
nonpartisan observers doubt whether this
trust fund saving has taken place in the past13
or would take place in the future.
Moreover, actuarial balance has tradition-
ally measured Social Security’s financing
only over a 75-year period, not in perpetuity.
This can have important effects on the per-
ceived size of Social Security’s financial
shortfalls as well as the degree to which per-
sonal account proposals can remedy those
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problems. The 2003 Trustees Report took
steps to address this difficulty with the mea-
sure of actuarial balance.
Cash Deficits
A better measure of Social Security’s financ-
ing health is its cash surpluses or deficits—that
is, how much it collects in taxes relative to how
much it has promised in benefits, without ref-
erence to the balance of the trust fund. Put
another way, cash flows measure Social
Security’s impact on the unified federal budget.
Cash flow deficits occur when Social
Security’s dedicated tax revenues—primarily
from payroll taxes, with a smaller portion
derived from income taxes levied on retirement
benefits—fall short of the amount of benefits
promised in a particular year. As Figure 2
shows, under the intermediate assumptions of
the 2003 Trustees Report, Social Security will
begin running cash deficits in 2018. This con-
stitutes an improvement of one year in cash
flow solvency from the 2002 report. 
Social Security’s cash deficits from 2018 to
the end of the 75-year scoring period in 2077
total $26.40 trillion (in today’s dollars). When
netted out against Social Security’s cash sur-
pluses prior to 2018, Social Security’s cash
flow over the next 75 years is a deficit of $25.33
trillion. As Figure 3 shows, this 75-year net
cash flow deficit increases with each passing
year, as periods of surplus at the beginning of
the 75-year scoring window are replaced by
years of deficits at the close.
Put in present value terms—the amount
we would need to invest today at the govern-
ment bond interest rate to cover future
deficits—Social Security’s 75-year cash flow
shortfall equals roughly $4.9 trillion.14 Of
that, $1.4 trillion is cash needed to redeem
the trust fund’s bonds while $3.5 trillion
would cover cash deficits from the point of
trust fund exhaustion in 2042 to the end of
the scoring period in 2077.
From 2018 to 2042, Social Security can
redeem the government bonds in its trust
fund to cover its cash flow deficits and pay
full scheduled benefits. However, these
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Figure 1
Over the Long Term, Social Security Costs Vastly Exceed Dedicated Tax Revenues
Source: 2003 Trustees Report.
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bonds don’t make Social Security benefits
any easier to pay for. After all, the govern-
ment must produce the cash to repay these
bonds. As the Clinton administration itself
stated in its FY 2000 budget: 
These [Trust Fund] balances are avail-
able to finance future benefit pay-
ments and other trust fund expendi-
tures—but only in a bookkeeping
sense. . . . They do not consist of real
economic assets that can be drawn
down in the future to fund benefits.
Instead, they are claims on the
Treasury that, when redeemed, will
have to be financed by raising taxes,
borrowing from the public, or reduc-
ing benefits or other expenditures.
The existence of large trust fund bal-
ances, therefore, does not, by itself,
have any impact on the Government’s
ability to pay benefits.15
It is for that reason that most nonpartisan ana-
lysts—such as the Congressional Budget Office,
Congressional Research Service, and General
Accounting Office—place greater emphasis on
unified budget measures that include the cost
of redeeming the trust fund’s bonds.
That does not mean that the trust fund’s
bonds will not be honored; they will and are
in every personal account proposal on
record. But in assessing the status of the cur-
rent Social Security program, we must
include all costs associated with the pro-
gram—including the very real cost of honor-
ing the trust fund’s assets. 
Perpetuity Measures of 
Solvency
Even cash flow measures have their short-
comings, if applied only over the 75-year scor-
ing period traditionally used by the trustees
and by Social Security’s actuaries. A number of
bipartisan commissions—among them the
1994–96 Advisory Council on Social Security,
the 1999 Technical Panel on Assumptions and
Methods, and the 2001 President’s Commis-
6
-$1,000
-$800
-$600
-$400
-$200
$0
$200
20
03
20
06
20
09
20
12
20
15
20
18
20
21
20
24
20
27
20
30
20
33
20
36
20
39
20
42
20
45
20
48
20
51
20
54
20
57
20
60
20
63
20
66
20
69
20
72
20
75
20
78
Figure 2
Social Security Cash Flow Deficits Begin in 2018
Source: 2003 Trustees Report.
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sion to Strengthen Social Security—have
argued that greater emphasis should be put
on solvency over the infinite term—commonly
referred to as “sustainability.”
The justification for sustainable solvency
is that a reform proposal that makes Social
Security solvent for only 75 years will imme-
diately become insolvent as the 75-year scor-
ing period moves forward over time, exclud-
ing years of surpluses at the beginning of the
period and including years of deficits at the
end. As the Technical Panel pointed out:
When reformers aim only for 75-year
balance, therefore, they usually end
up in a situation where their reforms
only last a year before being shown
out of 75-year balance again. The
1994–96 Advisory Council wisely
tried to accept only reforms that pro-
duced sustainability over the longer
term—sustainability defined in a way
that would ensure that taxes and
benefits were more or less in line
after the 75th year.16
It is only by focusing on the infinite term
that reformers can achieve proposals that can
be expected to remain solvent indefinitely
without any future reforms needed.
To that end, in the 2003 report the trustees
measure Social Security’s cash shortfalls not
simply over 75 years but in perpetuity. As
noted above, the present value of Social
Security’s total cash shortfalls over 75 years
equals roughly $4.9 trillion, consisting of $1.4
trillion to redeem the bonds in the Social
Security trust fund and $3.5 trillion to meet
cash deficits after the trust fund is exhausted. 
Extending the scoring period from 75
years to perpetuity adds an additional $7 tril-
lion (in present value) to the cost of main-
taining Social Security, bringing the total to
$11.9 trillion, as shown in Table 1.17 That is to
say, to eliminate Social Security’s cash
deficits permanently, we would need to pro-
duce a lump sum today of $11.9 trillion. 
This $11.9 trillion cash deficit can be seen
as an implicit debt of the government, a
promise to make payments in the future
(though with no dedicated stream of income
7
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to cover those payments). Like any debt, delay-
ing repayment only increases the debt’s size, in
this case by roughly $350 billion annually.18
This implicit pension debt is more than three
times greater than the $3.7 trillion federal debt
currently held by the public.
Opponents of reform based on personal
accounts often downplay Social Security’s
financing problems, referring to them as a
“2-percent problem” of actuarial imbalance
for which a mere two percentage point pay-
roll tax increase would be the solution. By
contrast, proponents of reform often warn
that without change, within 30 years Social
Security’s costs would require a payroll tax
rate of some 17 percent or more.
The new methodology outlined in the
2003 Trustees Report shows that both camps
are wrong. To maintain the current Social
Security financing structure indefinitely
demands an almost 17 percent tax rate today,
not decades in the future. Consider the tax
increase that would be needed to keep Social
Security solvent under its current financing:
• The 75-year actuarial deficit of 1.92 per-
cent of payroll implies that a 1.92 per-
centage point increase in the payroll tax
today—from 12.4 percent of wages to
14.32—would keep Social Security tech-
nically solvent for 75 years.
• However, the 75-year actuarial deficit
ignores the cost of repaying the trust
fund’s bonds. Trust fund repayment
would demand an additional immedi-
ate tax increase equal to roughly 0.67
percent of payroll. This would raise the
total cost rate to 15.03 percent of
wages.19
• Finally, to keep Social Security solvent
not simply for 75 years but permanently
would demand an additional immediate
tax increase of 1.88 percent of payroll.20
Taken together, to cover all of Social Security’s
cash deficits into perpetuity demands an
immediate and permanent tax increase of
roughly 4.47 percentage points, to 16.87 per-
cent of payroll. Including revenue derived
from income taxes on benefits, this would
increase the total Social Security contribution
rate to 18.93 percent of taxable payroll. Again,
those are the steps that would be needed if we
acted immediately; delay only increases the size
of the necessary tax increase.
The substantial, immediate, and permanent
tax increases needed to keep the traditional Social
Security program solvent in perpetuity show the
bar that personal account plans have set for
themselves, since most account plans achieve not
simply 75-year but sustainable, permanent sol-
vency. Thus, the “pain” of accounts plans should
be properly compared not to a 1.92 percentage
point payroll tax increase but to a 3.8 percentage
point hike (assuming that the reform plan also
shoulders the 0.67 percent cost of redeeming
trust fund bonds). By that measure, the strength
of personal account proposals becomes clearer.
Some critics would argue that solvency
measures in perpetuity are not needed, that
we should not place undue emphasis on the
program’s finances more than 75 years in the
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Table 1
Lump Sum Payments Needed Today to Maintain Permanent Solvency
Purpose Payment Size (present value)
Redeem trust fund bonds $1.4 trillion
Cover cash shortfalls through 2077 $3.5 trillion
Cover cash shortfalls after 2077 $7.0 trillion
Total $11.9 trillion
Source: 2003 Trustees Report.
future. That charge is misguided for two rea-
sons. First, children born today can expect to
be covered by the Social Security program
more than 75 years hence, with a second gen-
eration living substantially beyond that
point. Therefore, if Social Security is to
honor its promises to our children and
grandchildren, mere 75-year solvency is clear-
ly insufficient. Moreover, the present value
measures used in perpetuity calculations do
place greater emphasis on dollar values today
than on dollar values in the future. While a
perpetuity measure accounts for Social
Security’s cash flow, say, 200 years from now,
the process of discounting assigns a dollar in
2203 substantially less weight than it does a
dollar in 2003. Thus, a perpetuity measure
doesn’t say that Social Security’s financial
status in 2203 counts more than its status
today; it merely says that Social Security’s
financial status in 2203 counts, and therefore
should be part of a long-term solution.
Effect of Perpetuity
Measures on Personal
Account Plans
Scoring Social Security’s finances in perpe-
tuity has another important effect on reform.
The traditional 75-year scoring period con-
tains a substantial methodological bias
against any effort to prefund Social Security
benefits, particularly personal accounts. 
Under a personal account plan, workers
would invest part of their payroll taxes in an
account while working. In exchange, they
would give up part of their traditional gov-
ernment-paid benefits when they retired.
Thus, reductions in traditional system funds
due to personal account contributions are
offset by reductions in the future benefits the
traditional program owes to account holders.
In a present value measurement, those two
factors should roughly offset one another.
The difficulty with a truncated 75-year
scoring period—or any scoring period other
than the infinite term—is that it counts per-
sonal account contributions as losses to the
traditional program’s finances but fails to
count reductions in benefit liabilities as gains
to the system if those benefits would have
been paid after the scoring period is finished.
Consider a worker retiring in 2077, the final
year of the current scoring period. His
account contributions during the scoring
period count against Social Security’s
finances, but the traditional benefits he
agrees to forego are not counted as gains to
system finances, since he does not retire until
after the scoring period is completed.
The 75-year scoring window’s failure to
count both sides of the equation creates a sub-
stantial bias against personal account propos-
als relative to pay-as-you-go financing or cen-
tralized investment of the trust fund. Pay-as-
you-go funding makes no attempt to prefund
future benefits, so contributions to the pro-
gram and the payoff from such contributions
are never on different sides of the scoring win-
dow. Centralized investment of the trust fund
also suffers no such bias, since the balance of
the trust fund is accounted for as part of the
75-year actuarial balance. Other supplemen-
tary measures can reveal the financial
strengths of personal account proposals.
Nevertheless, to the extent that public debate
over reform focuses on actuarial balance, the
current accounting methods put personal
account plans at an unfair disadvantage.
To illustrate this bias in the 75-year win-
dow, and thus the need for perpetuity mea-
sures of solvency, consider reform Model 1
from the President’s Commission to
Strengthen Social Security.21 Model 1 allowed
workers to invest two percentage points of
their payroll taxes in a personal account.
Workers choosing personal accounts would
give up traditional benefits equal to their
account contributions compounded at a 3.5
percent real interest rate. Since the trust fund
is assumed to earn 3 percent interest, losses
to the fund through account contributions
would be more than compensated for by the
larger benefit offsets that workers agree to.
Although Model 1 would not fix all of Social
Security’s problems, it seems intuitively clear
that it would at least move Social Security’s
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finances in the right direction.
But that’s not the way the traditional 75-
year scoring period judges Model 1, because
the 75-year window fails to count gains to
Social Security’s finances that were accumu-
lated during the 75-year window but don’t
actually pay off until after the window ends.
Social Security’s traditional 75-year scoring
gives the misleading impression that Model 1
actually worsens Social Security’s financial
standing, reducing actuarial balance from a
deficit of 1.86 percent of payroll to a deficit
of 2.18 percent of payroll.22
But the 75-year scoring window ignores
the fact that at the end of the 75-year period,
Model 1 leaves Social Security with $861 bil-
lion (in present value) worth of future benefit
offsets based on account contributions dur-
ing the 75-year period. 
An improved accounting system would at
least include the present value of improve-
ments to Social Security’s finances accumulat-
ed during the 75-year period, even if those
improvements don’t actually occur until
after the period is over. Commission Model
1’s $861 billion in future benefit offsets as of
2075 is equal to roughly 0.5 percent of pay-
roll. If this amount were added to the 75-year
actuarial balance of Model 1, it would show
Model 1 reducing Social Security’s deficit
from 1.86 percent of payroll to roughly 1.68
percent of payroll. This 0.18 percent of pay-
roll improvement is equivalent to the federal
budget receiving a lump sum today of rough-
ly $310 billion. Because Social Security’s 75-
year scoring window omits financial
improvements occurring after the period
ends, Model 1’s $310 billion lump sum gain
to the budget is treated as a $550 billion loss.
Scoring personal account plans in perpetu-
ity removes the 75-year window’s substantial
methodological bias and shows the true advan-
tages of prefunding future retirement benefits.
To date, only personal account–based propos-
als have been shown to make Social Security
solvent in perpetuity. Proposals from the
Clinton administration would have kept Social
Security solvent only into the 2050s; proposals
from Reps. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.) and Peter
DeFazio (D-Ore.) would keep Social Security
solvent through 75 years, but not permanently.
By contrast, the comprehensive personal
account plans from the president’s reform
commission and legislative proposals from
members of Congress such as Reps. Jim Kolbe
(R-Ariz.), Charlie Stenholm (D-Tex.), Jim
DeMint (R-S.C.), and Clay Shaw (R-Fla.) would
keep Social Security solvent forever. Permanent
versus mere 75-year solvency is an important
distinction when we consider whether Social
Security will be around for our children and
grandchildren.
Stochastic Analysis
The 2003 Trustees Report also contained
for the first time a so-called stochastic analy-
sis of the program’s finances, which assigns
probabilities to different possible outcomes
for system solvency. 
By way of background, trustees reports
have traditionally presented three cost esti-
mates for the program, dubbed the high-,
low-, and intermediate-cost projections, as
shown in Table 2. These alternate cost pro-
jections are based on different assumptions
regarding each of the economic and demo-
graphic variables affecting Social Security’s
finances, shown in Table 3. The intermediate
projections are considered by the trustees to
be the most likely and are used in most analy-
ses of policy proposals.
The high-cost projections measure Social
Security’s solvency when all of these econom-
ic and demographic variables are assumed to
take values that raise costs to the program.
Likewise, the low-cost projections assume
that all the variables take values that reduce
costs to the program.
Social Security’s chief actuary notes that
the high- and low-cost values for each individ-
ual variable are considered to be “quite
unlikely to be achieved on the average in the
long run.”23 For them all to be achieved over
the long run is less likely still; not quite the
equivalent of pulling a royal flush in poker,
but close. It is thus extremely unlikely that
10
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either the high-cost or low-cost projections
as a whole would come to pass.
Nevertheless, some opponents of reform
claim that the low-cost projections—which
show Social Security remaining solvent
throughout 75 years—are as likely as the inter-
mediate-cost projections. They use these
claims to justify putting off action on reform,
and have received greater press attention than
they deserve.24
Stochastic analysis shows how unlikely it
is that Social Security will remain solvent
without reform. Stochastic analysis allows
each of the economic and demographic fac-
tors to vary from its assumed intermediate-
cost value throughout the 75-year scoring
period, as they would vary in real life. Social
Security’s actuaries produced 5,000 “runs” in
which these factors vary, then assessed how
the interaction of these variations affects
Social Security’s financing over time.
Through this stochastic analysis, the
trustees can determine the likelihood of dif-
ferent financial outcomes for the program.
Figure 4, excerpted from the 2003 Trustees
Report, illustrates this. The vertical (y) axis
shows the balance of the trust fund as a per-
centage of annual benefit payments (the so-
called “trust fund ratio”), beginning from
where it stands today. The lines emanating
from the starting point show the possible
paths for the fund’s balance as it grows over
11
Table 2
Actuarial Surplus or Deficit (as Percent of Payroll) under Alternate Cost Assumptions
Low Cost Intermediate Cost High Cost
0.4 -1.92 -5.07
Source: 2003 Trustees Report, Table IV.B5. 
Table 3
Ultimate Values of Key Demographic and Economic Assumptions
Ultimate Assumptions Low Cost Intermediate Cost High Cost
Total fertility rate 
(children per woman) 2.2 1.95 1.7
Average annual percentage 
reduction in total age-sex-
adjusted death rates from
2027 to 2077 .34 .73 1.27
Annual net immigration 
(in thousands) 1,300 900 672.5
Annual percentage change in:
Average wage in covered employment 3.6 4.1 4.6
Consumer price index (CPI) 2.0 3.0 4.0
Real-wage growth (percent) 1.6 1.1 .6
Productivity (total U.S. economy) 1.9 1.6 1.3
Unemployment rate (percent) 4.5 5.5 6.5
Annual trust fund interest rate (percent) 5.7 6.0 6.2
Source: 2003 Trustees Report, Table II.C1.
Some opponents
of reform claim
that the low-cost
projections are 
as likely as the
intermediate-cost
projections.
the near term and heads toward insolvency in
the longer term. The point where a line
strikes the horizontal (x) axis signifies the
date of trust fund insolvency.
The line labeled “50 percent” tracks the
trustees’ intermediate cost projections, in
which the program becomes insolvent in
2041 (using assumptions from the 2002
Trustees Report; time prevented the trustees
from performing the stochastic analysis on
their latest set of assumptions). The 50 per-
cent figures denote that 50 percent of pro-
jected outcomes have the trust fund becom-
ing insolvent prior to 2041 and 50 percent
after 2041. The intermediate projections
thus form the median, or middle point, of
the range of possibilities. 
The line labeled “2.5 percent” in which the
trust fund becomes insolvent in 2032
denotes that, of the 5,000 iterations of the
stochastic model, only 2.5 percent of out-
comes had the fund becoming insolvent
prior to 2032. Likewise, the line marked “97.5
percent” on the right side of the chart
denotes that in 97.5 instances the trust fund
become insolvent prior to the year 2075.
Roughly speaking, the trustees’ stochastic
analysis assigns probabilities to the tradition-
al low-cost and high-cost projections. There
is only a 2.5 percent chance that the high-cost
projection of insolvency in 2032 or earlier
will take place. Likewise, in only 2.5 percent
of outcomes does the low-cost assumption of
solvency through 2075 take place.
In other words, there is a less than 1-in-40 likeli-
hood that Social Security will remain solvent for 75
years without any changes to the system’s financing.
The chances of Social Security remaining sol-
vent indefinitely without change are even more
remote. The stochastic analysis in the 2003
Trustees Report clearly rebuts opponents of
reform who claim that the program needs no
changes.25
Conclusion
Certain aspects of the 2003 Trustees
Report appear to show only minor changes
in Social Security’s finances, in one direction
or the other. Trust fund exhaustion and the
more important cash flow deficit dates were
delayed by one year apiece, an improvement
versus the 2002 report. On the other hand,
the actuarial balance of the program declined
to a deficit of 1.92 percent of payroll and
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Figure 4
Stochastic Projections of Trust Fund Solvency
Source: 2003 Trustees Report.
There is a less than
1-in-40 likelihood
that Social
Security will
remain solvent for
75 years without
any changes to the
system’s financing.
Social Security’s 75-year total cash flow
deficit increased from $23.87 trillion in the
2002 report to $25.33 trillion (in today’s dol-
lars) in the 2003 edition. 
The more important changes in the 2003
Trustees Report were in the areas of method-
ology. Inclusion of solvency measures over an
infinite horizon show the present value of
Social Security’s unfunded liabilities to be
three times higher than in the traditional 75-
year window; infinite term cash flow deficits
are almost 2.5 times larger than over the 75-
year period. Only personal account plans
have been certified by Social Security’s inde-
pendent actuaries to eliminate this permanent
funding deficit.
Moreover, perpetuity measures of solven-
cy remove a substantial methodological bias
against personal account plans. Scored on a
perpetuity basis, the benefits derived from
personal accounts after the close of the 75-
year window can be incorporated into the
proposal’s scoring, further clarifying person-
al accounts’ financial advantages over the tra-
ditional program.
Finally, while perpetuity measures show
that Social Security’s deficits are much larger
than previously understood, the inclusion of
a stochastic analysis shows how unlikely it is
that Social Security’s finances will “fix them-
selves” without reform. There is only a 1-in-
40 likelihood that the current program will
remain solvent through even 75 years with-
out action.
The one conclusion all should share from
the 2003 Trustees Report is that action is
needed on Social Security, and the sooner
action is taken the easier and cheaper it will be. 
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